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Abstract
We describe a vertically di¤erentiated market where …rms choose
between activating either independent ventures leading to distinct
product qualities, or a joint venture for a single quality. Then, …rms
either repeat the one-shot Nash equilibrium forever, or behave col-
lusively, according to discount factors. We prove that there exists a
parameter region where the joint venture makes it more di¢cult for
…rms to sustain collusive behaviour, as compared to independent ven-
tures. Therefore, public policies towards R&D behaviour should be
designed so as not to become inconsistent with the pro-competitive
attitude characterising the current legislation on marketing practices.
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1 Introduction
Oligopoly theory has produced a relevant literature on repeated market inter-
action. The relative e¢ciency of Bertrand and Cournot competition in stabi-
lizing cartels composed by …rms whose products are imperfect substitutes has
been analysed by Deneckere (1983), Rothschild (1992) and Albæk and Lam-
bertini (1998), showing that when substitutability between products is high,
collusion is better supported in price-setting games than in quantity-setting
games, while the reverse is true in case of low substitutability.1 Majerus
(1988) has proved that this result is not con…rmed as the number of …rms
increases. These contributions compare Cournot and Bertrand supergames
to conclude that a quantity-setting cartel should almost always be preferred
to a price-setting cartel on stability grounds.2 Finally, the in‡uence of en-
dogenous product di¤erentiation on the stability of collusion in prices has
been investigated by Chang (1991, 1992), Ross (1992) and Häckner (1994,
1995, 1996). The main …nding reached by these contributions is that, under
vertical di¤erentiation, collusion is more easily sustained, the more similar
the products are, while the opposite applies under horizontal di¤erentiation.
The consequences of collusion on the extent of optimal di¤erentiation in
the horizontal di¤erentiation model have also received attention. Friedman
and Thisse (1993) have considered a repeated price game in the horizontal
framework and found out that minimum di¤erentiation obtains if …rms col-
lude in the market stage. In most of these models, although di¤erentiation
can be endogenously determined by …rms through strategic interaction, the
issue of cartel stability is studied by making the degree of di¤erentiation
vary symmetrically around the ideal midpoint of the interval of technolog-
ically feasible or socially preferred varieties, leading to the conclusion that
producers may prefer to choose the characteristics of their respective goods
di¤erently from what pro…t maximization would suggest, if this helps them
minimize the incentive to deviate from the implicit cartel agreement.
1The same question is addressed in Lambertini (1996), where the evaluation of cartel
stability under Bertrand and Cournot behaviour is carried out in terms of the concav-
ity/convexity of the market demand function.
2This approach cannot grasp any strategic interaction behind the choice of the market
variable. Using the same demand structure as in Deneckere (1983) and analysing asymmet-
ric cartels where one …rm is a Bertrand agent while the other is a Cournot one, Lambertini
(1997) proves that the choice of the market variable in order to stabilize implicit collusion
produces a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
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To our knowledge, little attention has been paid so far to the interplay
between …rms’ technological decisions and their ability to build up and main-
tain collusive agreements over time. This is a relevant issue, in that public
authorities prosecute collusive market behaviour, while they seldom discour-
age cooperation in R&D activities. Indeed, there exist many examples of
policy measures designed so as to stimulate the formation of research joint
ventures.3 However, encouraging cooperative R&D and discouraging market
collusion can be mutually inconsistent moves, if R&D cooperation tends to
facilitate collusion in the product market.
In this respect, Martin (1995) analyses the strategic e¤ects of a research
joint venture (JV henceforth) designed to achieve a process innovation for
an existing product. Then, the product is marketed by …rms engaging in
repeated Cournot behaviour over an in…nite time horizon. Martin shows
that cooperation in process innovation enhances implicit collusion, which can
jeopardise the welfare advantage of eliminating e¤ort duplication through the
JV . This result has potential implications for the case of product innovation
as well.4
We reassess Martin’s framework, by considering a vertically di¤erentiated
market where …rms are given the possibility of choosing between activating
either independent ventures leading to distinct product qualities, or a joint
venture for a single quality, aimed at reducing the initial R&D expenditure
vis à vis independent ventures. Then, …rms market the product(s) over an in-
…nite horizon. In doing so, they either repeat the one-shot Nash equilibrium
forever, or behave collusively, according to their intertemporal discounting.
In such a setting, we prove that there exists a parameter region where Mar-
tin’s conclusion is reversed, i.e., the JV makes it more di¢cult for …rms to
sustain collusive behaviour in the market supergame, as compared to inde-
pendent ventures. This holds independently of whether …rms set prices or
quantities during the supergame. Our result entails that public policies to-
wards the R&D behaviour of …rms should be tailored case by case, so as not
to become inconsistent with the pro-competitive attitude characterising the
3See the National Cooperative Research Act in the US ; EC Commission (1990) ; and,
for Japan, Goto and Wakasugi (1988).
4Lambertini, Poddar and Sasaki (1998) adopt the same view as in Martin (1995), al-
though they consider the relationship between standardization and the stability of implicit
cartel agreeements. See also Lambertini, Poddar and Sasaki (2000). Cabral (1996), in a
somewhat dissimilar vein, proves the possibility that competitive pricing is needed to
sustain more e¢cient R&D agreements.
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current legislation on marketing practices.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The basic model
of vertical di¤erentiation is described in section 2. Section 3 describes the
case of collusion along the frontier of monopoly pro…ts. Section 4 deals with
partial collusion under either Cournot or Bertrand behaviour. Finally, section
6 provides concluding remarks.
2 The vertical di¤erentiation model
We adopt a well known model of duopoly under vertical di¤erentiation (see
Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979, 1980; Motta, 1993; Aoki and Prusa, 1997;
Lehmann-Grube, 1997; Lambertini, 1999, inter alia).5 Two single-product
…rms, labelled as H and L, produce goods of (di¤erent) qualities qH and
qL 2 [0;1), with qH ¸ qL; through the same technology, C(qi) = cq2i ; with
c > 0: This can be interpreted as …xed cost due to the R&D e¤ort needed to
produce a certain quality, while variable production costs are assumed away.
Products are o¤ered on a market where consumers have unit demands, and
buy if and only if the net surplus from consumption vµ(qi; pi) = µqi ¡ pi ¸ 0;
where pi is the unit price of the good of quality qi, purchased by a generic
consumer whose marginal willingness to pay is µ 2 [0; µ]: We assume that µ
is uniformly distributed with density one over such interval, so that the total
mass of consumer is µ.
Firms interact over t 2 [0;1); as follows:
² At t = 0; they conduct R&D towards the development of product
quality, through either a joint venture (JV henceforth) or independent
ventures (IV henceforth). If …rms undertake a joint venture, then
qi = qj = q and each …rm bears half the development cost, cq2=2.
Otherwise, …rms market di¤erentiated products, each of them bearing
the full development cost of their respective varieties, cq2i .
6
² Over t 2 [1;1); …rms market the product(s) resulted from previous
R&D activity, either à la Cournot or à la Bertrand.
5A di¤erent model is used in Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983), where …xed costs are
exogenous.
6The R&D e¤orts of …rms operating in vertically di¤erentited markets are investigated
in Beath et al. (1987), Motta (1992), Dutta et al. (1995), Rosenkranz (1995, 1997), van
Dijk (1996). In particular, Motta (1992) and Rosenkranz (1997) describe the incentives
towards cooperative R&D.
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² In the in…nitely long marketing phase, …rms may collude if their respec-
tive time discounting allows them to do so. Otherwise, they always play
à la Nash. De…ne as ±i the discount factor of …rm i; and ±Ii (K) the crit-
ical threshold for the stability of collusion, with superscript I = B;C
standing for Bertrand and Cournot, and K = IV; JV; indicating the
organizational design chosen for the R&D phase.
As a …rst step, observe that the locations of indi¤erent consumers along
[0; µ] are:
µH =
pH ¡ pL
qH ¡ qL ; µL =
pL
qL
(1)
where µH is the marginal willingness to pay of the consumer who is indi¤erent
between qH and qL; and µL is the marginal willingness to pay of the consumer
who is indi¤erent between qL and not buying at all. Then, market demands
are
xH = µ ¡ µH ; xL = µH ¡ µL : (2)
Notice that (2) can be inverted to yield the relevant demand functions for
the Cournot case:
pH = qH
³
µ ¡ xH
´
¡ qLxL ; pL = qL
³
µ ¡ xH ¡ xL
´
: (3)
At any t ¸ 1; …rm i obtains revenues RIi = pixi; I = B;C: The discounted
‡ow of pro…ts over the whole game is then:
¼Ii =
8>><>>:
±i
1¡ ±i ¢R
I
i (qi; qj)¡ cq2i under IV
±i
1¡ ±i ¢R
I
i (q)¡
cq2
2
under JV
(4)
To model collusion in marketing, we adopt the Perfect Folk Theorem (PFT
henceforth; see Friedman, 1971), where the in…nite reversion to the one-shot
Nash equilibrium is used as a punishment following any deviation from the
prescribed collusive path.7 The collusive path can instruct …rms to collude
either fully (i.e., at the Pareto frontier of monopoly pro…ts) or partially, at
7There exist other (less grim) penal codes (see Abreu, 1986; 1988; Abreu, Pearce and
Stacchetti, 1986; Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986), using symmetric optimal punishments.
However, the asymmetry of our model prevents us from adopting optimal punishments.
For the application of optimal punishments in a symmetric duopoly model with product
di¤erentiation, see Lambertini and Sasaki (1999, 2000).
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any pair of prices or quantities such that per-period individual revenues are
at least as large as the Nash equilibrium revenues.
De…ne:
[1] The instantaneous best reply of …rm i as ®¤i :
[2] The collusive action as ®coll 2
³
min
n
®N ; ®M
o
;max
n
®N ; ®M
oi
; ® = p; x:
[3] The collusive revenues to …rm i as RIcolli (¢) ; (¢) = f(q); (qi; qj)g :
[4] The one-shot Nash revenues to …rm i as RINi (¢):
[5] The one-shot deviation revenues to …rm i as RIDi (¢):
The rules of the PFT establish what follows:
² At t = 0; …rms play ®coll:
² At t ¸ 1; …rms play ®coll i¤ ®i = ®coll at t¡ 1 for all i ;
…rms play ®¤i otherwise.
De…nitions [3-5] and the rules of PFT yields that implicit collusion at
®coll is sustainable i¤
±i ¸ ±Ii (K) =
RIDi (¢)¡RIcolli (¢)
RIDi (¢)¡RINi (¢)
for all i : (5)
In the next section, we quickly deal with the case of full collusion, where
®coll = ®M :
3 Full collusion
First, notice that when …rms operate along the frontier of monopoly pro…ts,
they are indi¤erent between settting prices or output levels. Therefore, we
con…ne our attention to the Bertrand case.
Suppose …rms choose independent ventures at t = 0: Then, over t 2
[1;1), they should market di¤erent products. We are going to show that
this cannot be an equilibrium. At any t 2 [1;1), the cartel aims at
max
pH ; pL
RM = RBH(qH ; qL) +R
B
L (qL; qH) : (6)
6
Monopoly prices are:
pMH =
µqH
2
; pML =
µqL
2
; (7)
at which xMH =
µ
2
, while xML = 0: Therefore,
¼BH =
±H
1¡ ±H ¢
µ
2
qH
4
¡ cq2H ; ¼BL = ¡cq2L : (8)
On the basis of the above result, independent ventures imply that, for all
qL 2 (0; qH); the low-quality …rm would exit , getting thus zero pro…ts.
Alternatively, …rm L may produce qL = qH : This immediately entails that
±Bi = 1=2 for all i; as …rms o¤er homogeneous goods.
It needs no proof to show that the same holds in the case of a joint
venture, as this would yield product homogeneity as a result of technological
decisions taken at t = 0: We have thus proved the following:
Lemma 1 Under full collusion, the low-quality product enjoys zero demand.
As a consequence, …rms will only supply homogeneous goods, with JV Â IV
due to the cost-saving e¤ect.
Corollary 1 Under full collusion in prices, ±Bi = 1=2 for all i; independently
of …rms’ venture decisions.
As to the Cournot case, notice that, as long as …rms provide di¤erent
qualities, we have
xMH =
µ
2
; xML = 0 (9)
which again entails that the low-quality …rm survives only if qL = qH ; ei-
ther because …rms activate a JV , or because …rms develop the same quality
independently of each other. As a result, we can state the following:
Lemma 2 Under full collusion in quantities, ±Ci = 9=17 for all i; indepen-
dently of …rms’ venture decisions.
In summary, independently of the market variable chosen for the su-
pergame over t 2 [1;1), the …rms’ venture decisions at t = 0 have no
bearings on the stability of collusion, as setting either monopoly prices or
quantities induces …rms to play a supergame with homogeneous goods.
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4 Partial collusion
Here, we investigate the bearings of technological choices on cartel stability,
under the assumption that …rms may activate partial collusion, i.e., they may
collude at any ®coll 2
³
min
n
®N ; ®M
o
;max
n
®N ; ®M
oi
; ® = p; x:
4.1 Cournot behaviour
Consider partial collusion at xcoll 2
³
xM ; xN
´
, for a generic quality pair
fqH ; qLg : In the limit, as qL ! qH ; we obtain the description of the JV case.
We de…ne the partially collusive output of …rm i as:
xcolli = ax
N
i + (1¡ a)xMi ; a 2 (0; 1) ; (10)
where xMi = x
M=2 = µ=4 and8
xCNH =
µ (2qH ¡ qL)
4qH ¡ qL ; x
CN
L =
µqH
4qH ¡ qL : (11)
The associated Nash equilibrium revenues are:
RCNH =
µ
2
qH (2qH ¡ qL)2
(4qH ¡ qL)2
; RCNL =
µ
2
q2HqL
(4qH ¡ qL)2
: (12)
Substituting (11) into (10) and rearranging, we have:
xcollH =
µ [4qH(1 + a)¡ qL(1 + 3a)]
4 (4qH ¡ qL) ; x
coll
L =
µ [4qH ¡ qL(1¡ a)]
4 (4qH ¡ qL) (13)
which allow to calculate RCcolli :
RCcollH =
µ
2
[4q2H(3¡ a)¡ qHqL(7¡ 3a) + q2L(1¡ a)] [4qH(1¡ a)¡ qL(1 + 3a)]
16 (4qH ¡ qL)2
RCcollL =
µ
2
qL [2qH (2¡ a)¡ qL(1 + a)] [4qH ¡ qL(1¡ a)]
8 (4qH ¡ qL)2
(14)
8We omit the explicit derivation of the Nash equilibrium quantities, as it is well known
from previous literature (see Motta, 1993).
8
The deviation from xcolli remains to be described. The best reply of …rm
j to xcolli is given by:
9
xDCH =
µ
h
(4qH ¡ qL)2 ¡ aq2L
i
8qH (4qH ¡ qL) ; x
DC
H =
4µqH(3¡ a)¡ 3µqL(1¡ a)
8 (4qH ¡ qL) (15)
yielding deviation revenues:
RDCH =
µ
2
h
(4qH ¡ qL)2 ¡ aq2L
i2
64qH (4qH ¡ qL)2
; RDCL =
µ
2
qL
h
4qH(3¡ a)¡ 3µqL(1¡ a)
i2
64 (4qH ¡ qL)2
:
(16)
We are now able to write the expressions for the critical threshold of the
discount factors:
±CH =
(1¡ a) (2qH ¡ qL)2 (4qH ¡ qL)2
q2L [32q
2
H ¡ 16qHqL + q2L(1¡ a)]
; (17)
±CL =
(1¡ a) (4qH ¡ qL)2
(4qH ¡ 3qL) [4qH(5¡ a) ¡ 3qL(1¡ a)] : (18)
Notice that the above critical thresholds are independent of µ; and can be
plotted over the space fa; qLg ; after setting qH = 1.10 This is done in …gures
1 and 2.
9Both xDH and x
D
L are admissible for all a 2 (0; 1] and qL 2 (0; qH ]: As usual, deviation
against a collusive output never drives the cheated …rm out of business, and never makes
the deviator a monopolist.
10Note that this normalisation involves no loss of generality, since the same plots would
obtain by rewriting ±Ci in terms of the quality ratio qL=qH 2 (0; 1]:
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Figure 1. Plot of ±CH over fa; qLg , with a 2 [0; 1] and qL 2 [0; 1] .
0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1 
a 
0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1 
qL 
0 
0.2 
0.4 
dL 
Figure 2. Plot of ±CL over fa; qLg , with a 2 [0; 1] and qL 2 [0; 1] .
Observe …gure 1. The range of ±CH is truncated at 9/17 to put into evi-
dence the parameter region wherein independent ventures make it easier for
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the high-quality …rm to sustain quantity collusion, as compared to a joint
venture. The equation of the border at which ±CH = 9=17 is:
ba = 2q4L ¡ 15q3L + 149q2L ¡ 408qL + 272
2q4L ¡ 51q3L + 221q2L ¡ 408qL + 272
: (19)
All combinations of fa; qLg de…ning a point along the downward sloping
surface in …gure 1, de…ne levels of partial collusion and low quality such that
independent ventures favour collusion as compared to a joint venture. The
opposite holds for any point such that
a 2
Ã
0 ;
2q4L ¡ 15q3L + 149q2L ¡ 408qL + 272
2q4L ¡ 51q3L + 221q2L ¡ 408qL + 272
!
: (20)
Consider now …gure 2. For any combination of a and qL in the admissible
range, ±CL · 9=17; holding as an equality at fa = 0; qL = qHg :11
The foregoing analysis allows us to state the following:
Proposition 1 For all a 2 (ba; 1] ; implicit collusion is more easily sustained
under independent ventures than under a joint venture. For all a 2 [0; ba) ;
the opposite holds.
This means that, given a generic quality ratio qL=qH ; independent ven-
tures are preferable to a joint venture in terms of cartel stability, if …rms col-
lude not too far above the disagreement point given by the one-shot Cournot
equilibrium. The shape of ba shows that, as far as cartel stability is con-
cerned, IV tends to become more and more advantageous compared to JV
as product di¤erentiation decreases. In the limit, as qL=qH ! 1; IV ensures
±Bi < 1=2 for all a 2 (0; 1] :
Alternatively, the above result can be reformulated as follows. As a in-
creases (that is, as the level of collusion weakens towards the Cournot-Nash
output), the range of qL=qH wherein IV ensures ±
B
i < 1=2 increases. The
intuition is that, if collusion is only slightly above the Nash equilibrium prof-
its, than deviation is scarcely pro…table and this drastically contributes to
stabilise implicit collusion.
11Notice that, in both plots, ±Ci becomes negative if a is su¢ciently large and qL=qH is
su¢ciently low, due to the fact that deviation pro…ts become lower than collusive pro…ts.
In such a case, it can be assumed ±Ci = 0; so that any ±i ¸ 0 ensures that the low-quality
…rm does not cheat. Clearly, this has no particular bearings on our analysis.
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4.2 Bertrand behaviour
Turn now to the case where …rms are price-setters and try to collude at
pcoll 2
³
pN ; pM
´
, for a generic quality pair fqH ; qLg : Again, in the limit, as
qL ! qH ; we obtain the picture of the JV case.
De…ne the partially collusive price of …rm i as:
pcolli = ap
N
i + (1¡ a)pMi ; a 2 (0; 1) ; (21)
where pMi = µqi=2 and
12
pNH =
2µqH (qH ¡ qL)
4qH ¡ qL ; p
N
L =
µqL (qH ¡ qL)
4qH ¡ qL : (22)
The associated Nash equilibrium revenues are:
RBNH =
µ
2
qH (2qH ¡ qL)2
(4qH ¡ qL)2
; RBNL =
µ
2
q2HqL
(4qH ¡ qL)2
: (23)
Substituting (22) into (21) and rearranging, we have:
pcollH =
µqH [4qH ¡ qL(1 + 3a)]
2 (4qH ¡ qL) ; p
coll
L =
µqL [2qH (2¡ a)¡ qL(1 + a)]
2 (4qH ¡ qL) (24)
which allow to calculate RBcolli :
RBcollH =
µ
2
qH [4qH ¡ qL(1¡ a)] [4qH ¡ qL(1 + 3a)]
4 (4qH ¡ qL)2
RBcollL =
µ
2
aqHqL [2qH (2¡ a)¡ qL(1 + a)]
2 (4qH ¡ qL)2
(25)
Now consider the deviation from pcolli . The best reply of …rm i against
the collusive price pcollj is:
pBDH =
µ [8q2H ¡ 2qHqL (3 + a) + q2L(1¡ a)]
4 (4qH ¡ qL)
pBDL =
µqL [4qH ¡ qL(1 + 3a)]
4 (4qH ¡ qL)
(26)
12Again, the explicit derivation of the Nash equilibrium prices is omitted for the sake of
brevity (see Choi and Shin, 1992; Motta, 1993).
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The corresponding output levels for the cheating …rm are:
xBDH =
µ [8q2H ¡ 2qHqL (3 + a) + q2L(1¡ a)]
4 (4q2H ¡ 5qHqL + q2L)
xBDL =
µqH [4qH ¡ qL(1 + 3a)]
4 (4q2H ¡ 5qHqL + q2L)
(27)
Notice that deviation outputs (27) are admissible for all values of fa; qH ; qLg
such that xBDi · µ; which entails the following restrictions, for all positive
µ :
xBDH · µ for all
qL
qH
2
"
0;
7¡ a¡ pa2 ¡ 22a+ 25
3 + a
#
; (28)
xBDL · µ for all
qL
qH
2
"
0;
19¡ 3a¡ p9a2 ¡ 114a+ 169
8
#
: (29)
The admissible range for the quality ratio in (29) is larger than in (28), i.e.,
19¡ 3a¡ p9a2 ¡ 114a+ 169
8
¸ 7¡ a¡
p
a2 ¡ 22a+ 25
3 + a
8 a 2 [0; 1] :
(30)
The above inequality entails that, as intuition would suggest, it is easier for
the high-quality than for the low-quality …rm to become a monopolist.
If (29) and (29) are met, then deviation revenues are:
RBDH =
µ
2
[8q2H ¡ 2qHqL (3 + a) + q2L(1¡ a)]2
16 (qH ¡ qL) (4qH ¡ qL)2
RBDL =
µ
2
qHqL [4qH ¡ qL (1 + 3a)]2
16 (qH ¡ qL) (4qH ¡ qL)2
(31)
Otherwise, the deviator becomes a monopolist. For the moment, we write
the critical threshold of the discount factors by using (31):
±BH =
(1¡ a)qL (4qH ¡ qL)2
(2qH ¡ qL) [16q2H ¡ 2qHqL(7 + a) + q2L(1¡ a)]
; (32)
±BL =
(1¡ a) (4qH ¡ qL)2
3qL [8qH ¡ qL(5 + 3a)] : (33)
Again, the above thresholds are independent of µ; and can be plotted over
the space fa; qLg ; after setting qH = 1. This is done in …gures 3 and 4, where
13
the range of both plots is bounded above at 1/2, corresponding to the critical
level of discounting associated with a joint venture.13
0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1 
a 
0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1 
ql 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
deltaH 
Figure 3. Plot of ±BH over fa; qLg , with a 2 [0; 1] and qL 2 [0; 1] .
13As in the Cournot case, whenever ±Bi < 0 because deviation is unpro…table, the
relevant threshold becomes ±Bi = 0:
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Consider …rst ±BL (…gure 4). We have:
±BL =
1
2
(34)
if
qL
qH
=
4
h
5¡ 2a§ 3p2a2 ¡ 1
i
17 + 7a
: (35)
The above solutions coincide at a = 1=
p
2 ' 0:707; where qL ' 0:653:
Then, observe the behaviour of ±BH (…gure 3). The border along which
±BH = 1=2 is everywhere to the north-west of the border (35).
Moreover, the curve xBDH = µ is also to the north-west of the border
(35).14
14Indeed, the equation
4
£
5 ¡ 2a + 3p2a2 ¡ 1¤
17 + 7a
=
7 ¡ a ¡ pa2 ¡ 22a + 25
3 + a
has no real root for a 2 [0; 1] ; with the r.h.s. being always larger than the l.h.s. over the
unit interval.
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The cases where deviation gives rise to a monopoly remain to be inves-
tigated. This would entail recalculating ±Bi anew, taking into account the
additional information conveyed by the complements to (28) and (29). Yet,
to the aims of the present paper, the following argument will su¢ce.
First, observe that, in general:
@±Ii
@RIDi
=
RIcolli ¡RINi
(RIDi ¡RINi )2
> 0 : (36)
At the boundary where xBDH = µ; critical discount factors are given by (32)
and (33). When
qL
qH
2
Ã
7¡ a¡ pa2 ¡ 22a+ 25
3 + a
;
19¡ 3a¡ p9a2 ¡ 114a+ 169
8
!
; (37)
the critical discount factor for …rm L is still given by (33), while that associ-
ated to …rm H is:
b±BH = RM ¡RBcollHRM ¡RBNH > ±BH =
RBDH ¡RBcollH
RBDH ¡RBNH
>
1
2
: (38)
Finally, when
qL
qH
>
19¡ 3a¡ p9a2 ¡ 114a+ 169
8
; (39)
we have b±BL = RM ¡RBcollLRM ¡RBNL > ±BL =
RBDL ¡RBcollL
RBDL ¡RBNL
>
1
2
; (40)
along with (38).
The above discussion su¢ces to establish the following result:
Proposition 2 Implicit collusion in prices is more easily sustained under
independent ventures than under a joint venture, for all
qL
qH
2
0@4
h
5¡ 2a¡ 3p2a2 ¡ 1
i
17 + 7a
;
4
h
5¡ 2a+ 3p2a2 ¡ 1
i
17 + 7a
1A
Outside the above range, the opposite holds.
As the intensity of collusion decreases towards the Bertrand-Nash equi-
librium pro…ts, i.e., as a grows larger, the range of product di¤erentiation
wherein collusion is easier under IV than under JV increases. The intuitive
explanation behind this conclusion is the same as in the Cournot case.
16
5 Concluding remarks
We have reassessed an issue previously raised by Martin (1995), under a new
perspective, where …rms’ initial R&D e¤orts are aimed at product rather
than process innovation. We have analysed the relationship between the
organizational design of R&D for product innovation and the stability of
implicit collusion either in quantities or in prices, keeping unaltered the rules
governing the market supergame, i.e., using the Perfect Folk Theorem.
The main conclusion emerging from this setting is that a JV may or may
not facilitate collusion in the market supergame, depending upon (i) the
degree of di¤erentiation produced by …rms activating independent ventures;
and (ii) the intensity of price or quantity collusion.
Independently of the market variable being set by …rms, we have found
that, the lower is the level of collusion, the lower is the pro…tability of de-
viation for any given degree of product di¤erentiation resulting from inde-
pendent ventures. This drastically contributes to stabilise implicit collusion,
in that a reduction of deviation pro…ts goes along with a reduction in the
critical threshold of the discount factor.
Therefore, public policies towards R&D behaviour should be designed so
as not to become inconsistent with the pro-competitive attitude characteris-
ing the current legislation on marketing practices.
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